As we Americans begin to see a decrease in our “boots on the ground overseas” and begin to swear off future occupations, there is renewed discussion in Washington about introducing more “official” foreign development assistance as a necessary surrogate and about reconstituting more government civilian employees abroad. Secretary Clinton’s call to build off of current foreign assistance models in the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) disturbs both me and colleagues who have lived and breathed the anomaly of the preceding century—that is to say, the American presumption that it can develop other societies effectively through the export of Americans overseas and, in many cases, by rushing largess through fledgling systems abroad.
Contrary to the declarations of agencies that benefit from the current model and the misguided notions of theorists such as Jeffrey Sachs,‘inclusive and participatory’ and ‘stable and productive’ states are rarely the result of more foreign assistance. They are a result of smarter foreign assistance. As most veteran field workers will tell you, the majority of “official” American development investments overseas have failed to sustain themselves—they lack local ownership and an equitable investment environment, both internally and externally. More “official” foreign assistance has mostly meant dependency, corruption, and waste.
In these times, which call for national austerity, the Secretary’s entreaty to Congress to multiply the ranks of civil servants abroad—at approximately $500,000 per officer (all-inclusive cost in fragile states), and at a time when new technologies and changing civil landscapes overseas offer more effective mechanisms—is behind the times. Be reminded that these “official” Americans abroad are for the most part sequestered inside American armed perimeters. They exist as enclaves in distant lands, spending most of their days stuck in cubicles, responding to taskers from Washington D.C., and spending their evenings with imported comfort food. The perpetuation of this model is shameful when Americans have such an attractive and necessary alternative: our own civil society.
The Way Forward
Through the judicious use of less than 40 percent of the tax dollars we spend annually on US Foreign Assistance, we can marry the best American civil society has to offer with the best of emerging civil society overseas. While we may not be able to assure “open and pluralistic” states—the expression used in 2003 to justify our entry into Iraq—we can give it a fighting chance, and by doing so, we can project American interests and values at a cost that is acceptable to Americans, as well as sustainable.
The successor model to what we have before us now (which grew out of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act) is predicated on the assumption that globalization is a force that we cannot deny. America can—and should—play a leading role through the careful provision of foreign assistance. But this assistance should harness the capacity and interests of the American private sector (both for-profit and nonprofit), not America’s interests and values as represented by federal employees. In short: civil society, not civil service.
For the cost of placing one federal aid worker in a perimeter overseas, America could, for example, fund a women’s empowerment group in Flatbush, Brooklyn, or any other community, to link, advocate, and support a women’s rights group in Iraq for a decade. In the 50 years since the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act was created, emerging civil society organizations overseas have become ubiquitous and capable, and more importantly, they have become owners of their own national development. They are universally enthusiastic about connecting and uniting with their likenesses in the United States. Certain groups in Flatbush also understand that women’s rights are a universal value.
Over the last 20 years, new technologies have taken root across the developing world. The rights group in Iraq could now, at little cost, communicate by phone, email, or webcam with the group in Flatbush, and form a lasting union around their shared concerns. The group in Flatbush might also choose to send money through a payment portal to support local needs, as defined by the members of the Iraqi group. Transparency and compliance with local and US law could be assured by other civil society organizations that have offices on the ground overseas to create such outcomes. The $500,000 I mentioned earlier could sustain a relationship for years and could create a permanent bond for right relations. Finally, as their local partners (versus a government security officer) assess risk, the Flatbush members could visit Iraq.
This same model could work for the Chamber of Commerce in Boise, the Persons with Disability Rights Group in Jacksonville, or the Youth Civic Participation Group in Des Moines. America has a mighty asset—a well-established civil society that we can use to project American interests and values overseas effectively. It would be counterproductive to do otherwise.
Notwithstanding the advocacy for this new model of foreign assistance, the US State Department’s role remains critical—not to implement, but to change and assign strategic purpose. It can offer public funds to jump-start this paradigm, coordinate its implementation, and evaluate its progress. The current assistance structure must be put away and modernized to incorporate citizen-to-citizen assistance and rapport in a significant and meaningful way. The days of the current “official assistance” juggernaut are numbered and will be replaced—as surely as the car replaced the horse and buggy a century ago—by engaged global citizens and the new technology at their fingertips.