The Nunn/Qian food aid study reminds us that even simple tools can have complex effects. And for that the study is valuable. But the study is being over-interpreted, whereas it’s actual findings are rather narrow:
* Food aid seems to extend civil, domestic conflicts in cases where recipient countries have been long-time food aid recipients and where conflict has been recurring for a long time.
* Food aid doesn’t appear to cause conflicts to start.
* It doesn’t seem to matter if the conflicts are big or small.
* It doesn’t seem to have any effect on inter-state conflict (rather than intra-state).
Most food aid during much of the study period (1971-2006) was not delivered as humanitarian aid, but was sent as economic assistance to friendly cold-war ally governments. From 1970 to 1990, 60% of food aid was sent as “title I” concessional sales for economic and market assistance rather “title II” for emergencies and development projects. In other words, the US sent crops to other country governments, who took control of the shipments, often selling them for cash. Food aid was a major aid program; it wasn’t used as food, it was used as a fundraising mechanism. So, it doesn’t seem reasonable to draw out too many implications for humanitarian aid.
The study points to the need for understanding negative impacts and trying to reduce them. If a lot of food aid is hijacked, how to reduce this “leakage” and ensure that control for humanitarian purposes and targets are maintained.
Thinking about the implications of this study, there’s a further analysis needed to operationalize its implications. The fact that food does – by some mechanism – extend conflict does not automatically mean we shouldn’t send food aid. The question will become: is the net benefit of the food aid higher than the cost? Do the lives saved and improved by food aid outweigh the lives lost to conflict and associated misery and impoverishment? That won’t be an easy analysis.
COMMENTS
BY gawain kripke
ON January 22, 2015 02:10 PM
The Nunn/Qian food aid study reminds us that even simple tools can have complex effects. And for that the study is valuable. But the study is being over-interpreted, whereas it’s actual findings are rather narrow:
* Food aid seems to extend civil, domestic conflicts in cases where recipient countries have been long-time food aid recipients and where conflict has been recurring for a long time.
* Food aid doesn’t appear to cause conflicts to start.
* It doesn’t seem to matter if the conflicts are big or small.
* It doesn’t seem to have any effect on inter-state conflict (rather than intra-state).
Most food aid during much of the study period (1971-2006) was not delivered as humanitarian aid, but was sent as economic assistance to friendly cold-war ally governments. From 1970 to 1990, 60% of food aid was sent as “title I” concessional sales for economic and market assistance rather “title II” for emergencies and development projects. In other words, the US sent crops to other country governments, who took control of the shipments, often selling them for cash. Food aid was a major aid program; it wasn’t used as food, it was used as a fundraising mechanism. So, it doesn’t seem reasonable to draw out too many implications for humanitarian aid.
The study points to the need for understanding negative impacts and trying to reduce them. If a lot of food aid is hijacked, how to reduce this “leakage” and ensure that control for humanitarian purposes and targets are maintained.
Thinking about the implications of this study, there’s a further analysis needed to operationalize its implications. The fact that food does – by some mechanism – extend conflict does not automatically mean we shouldn’t send food aid. The question will become: is the net benefit of the food aid higher than the cost? Do the lives saved and improved by food aid outweigh the lives lost to conflict and associated misery and impoverishment? That won’t be an easy analysis.
See more in my post on the study here: http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2014/06/food-aid-cause-conflict/