Illustration of two people using a spatula to share a pie chart (Illustration by iStock/sesame)

The term “social enterprise” once did essential work. After Harvard Business School mainstreamed the term in the 1990s by launching its Social Enterprise Initiative (the first of its kind at a major business school), the label named and legitimized a new category of entrepreneurs: those pursuing impact-motivated work but using business principles. The talent, capital, and academic attention it attracted spilled over into adjacent movements like impact investing and venture philanthropy.

I came up through social enterprise classrooms and initiatives and have spent my career as an operator in the field. I am a beneficiary. But it is precisely because I owe the term so much that I can say, with gusto, that the door it opened is now getting in the way. It has become so broad as to be practically useless, a term that can be applied equally to a food bank with an earned-revenue program, a microfinance lender, a venture-backed mental health platform, and in some circles, even a B Corp consumer brand. These organizations have little in common: not their capital needs, not their paths to scale, not their definitions of success, not the support structures they require.

Treating them as a single category has consequences, not just for individual organizations, but for the health of the impact market.

The Problem and the Consequence

The ecosystem allocates capital, builds support systems, and measures progress, across fundamentally different models, all under the single umbrella of “social enterprise.” The result is confusion: customers cannot discover the right products efficiently, products cannot differentiate effectively, investors cannot price risk accurately and supporting infrastructure struggles to match capability to need. And the consequence of this confusion is costly: slow discovery, clunky and costly coordination, disillusionment, and even exit.

Nobel laureate economist Alvin Roth has spent his career studying what makes markets work, and what makes them fail. His framework in Who Gets What and Why is instructive, arguing that successful markets must do three things: attract sufficient participants to create “thickness,” avoid congestion in the critical process of finding and completing transactions, and make participation safe enough that people engage directly rather than resorting to time or resource-intensive workarounds. When any of these conditions break down, the market underperforms. Now this is not necessarily because the activity has stopped, but rather it is because the infrastructure connecting supply and demand has failed. Over time, the result is that markets thin out as people transact outside or the market or even disengage.

This is what is happening in “social enterprise” today and has consequence for the supply of good ideas (founders) and the demand for good solutions (capital).

Supply. For founders, poor segmentation creates an information asymmetry that shows up in high acquisition cost of resources, financial and nonfinancial. A for-profit, technology-driven company attempting to reshape a regulated system needs early-stage, patient equity aligned with longer development cycles and higher adoption risk. A nonprofit with a blended funding model serving underserved markets may need concessionary capital in perpetuity. These are categorically different needs, but without shared language, founders are forced into trial and error across technical assistance programs, family offices, grant programs, impact funds, and more when momentum matters most. Their cost is time and often success.

Demand. Poor segmentation makes it hard for funders to know what they are being asked to fund. When every mission-oriented company is labeled a “social enterprise,” capital cannot match efficiently to underlying thesis, and the mismatches that follow (over-promising, underdelivering, diluted returns) teach funders that this is a risky category to name out loud. This is despite real efforts to define the demand side: impact investing, impact-first investing, concessionary investing, social investing. What we are seeing is Roth’s safety condition failing in a different form. Without a safe, simple way to say what they want, it becomes not just difficult but unsafe to transact, and funders quietly disengage rather than participate openly.

As a result, the market has not advanced significantly since mainstream brands first jumped in during the 2010s. Anecdotally, I’ve found that funders and founders sometimes avoid the label altogether because—they believe—it now carries more reputational cost than benefit. The field needs a working segmentation that reflects how these enterprises differ, and what those differences imply for capital, support, and accountability.

A Better Taxonomy

In 2024, we at MassChallenge retired “social impact” (our version of “social enterprise”) as a standalone classification in our portfolio taxonomy. The category had ceased to predict anything useful: not what a company needed, how it would grow, or how its success should be measured. Having worked with more than 5,000 startups across 65 countries over 16 years—from purely commercial (Flywire, payments) to nonprofit (Katie’s Closet)—and being disproportionately represented in hard and complex problems, where commercial capital will follow but rarely leads, we have begun to trace out some broad patterns.

Four archetypes have emerged, albeit with two caveats. First, these are patterns, not permanent boxes: a company’s archetype can shift as its model clarifies or as it scales, and some will genuinely straddle. Second, these are working labels not a proposed standard. I invite funders or support organizations to test this against their own portfolios and add to this conversation.

  1. Earned-Revenue Nonprofit
    These are legally 501(c)(3) entities with earned-revenue models: mission-first organizations for which earned revenue is a supplement or sustainable complement to philanthropy, in service of the primary mission. Their capital at the onset is most typically philanthropic (or government), their success is measured in programmatic impact, and their leverage, meaning the follow-on capital or scale that one philanthropic dollar can unlock, is limited by design. These are the storied first-generation social enterprises, such as Youth Villages or MassChallenge alumni Lovin Spoonfulls.
  2. Market Access Venture
    These are for-profit companies whose commercial success is directly tied to serving underserved populations or markets. Their path to scale is commercial but, if we are honest, constrained by margin realities or business model complexity, requiring patient, often concessionary capital. They may generate moderate leverage for "catalytic capital": early philanthropic or concessionary capital can catalyze the commercial investment that follows, by proving out a market conventional capital had written off. However, in some cases, concessionary capital will always be required in some form, even at scale. A reference point here could be John’s Crazy Socks.
  3. Systems Challenger Venture
    These are for-profit startups seeking to reshape how a system works for many, including but often not exclusive to underserved populations. In our data, they have high overlap with socially important categories like healthcare, education, food systems, and financial inclusion. In some domains, such as food systems or health science, there is overlap with the tough tech or hard tech ecosystems. Their ambition implies some combination of longer development timelines, higher adoption risk, and/or complex institutional relationships. Evaluated against standard venture benchmarks, they appear less attractive in the early stages. And yet, they may be rejected by impact investors too, because their blend of commercial ambition and systems-level mission doesn’t map to traditional impact measures, such as lives served. Claira.AI, for example, is a startup building the technology and business case to advance competency-based hiring.
  4. Values-Led Venture
    These are commercially “traditional” businesses with a genuine values orientation, operating within existing systems rather than trying to reshape them. They create real value through excellent execution within established market structures, not through structural change. Their measurement question is not "what is the social return?" but "is this company actually doing what it says it stands for?" Classic examples include Patagonia, and from our own portfolio Trust & Will.

Why Segment Social Enterprise?

Broadly speaking, the benefits of segmentation would be allowing supply and demand to find each other more efficiently, aligning capital to archetype, and specializing support by domain.

For one thing, doing so communicates directional guidance on the impact-return-risk archetype, in the same way that classifying a startup as consumer product good vs. technology communicates their likely business model profile, working capital needs, go-to-market motions to name only a few. For example, an Earned-Revenue Nonprofit is likely to have deep and often focused impact with limited leverage on philanthropic capital, and, with few exceptions, Earned-Revenue Nonprofits will continue to use philanthropy alongside earned revenue. On the other hand, Challenger Ventures offers high-potential leverage if patient equity or even philanthropy can de-risk a commercial business model, with more uncertainty to the direct impact as the startup navigates product-market-mission fit.

With clarity about this distinction, funders will be able to optimize for the kind of impact they want to have, and the type of capital they are willing to deploy. Similarly, founders can (within their more limited power) identify and pursue investors with the right focus and fit.

Another important benefit is that critical support systems that run alongside financial capital partners be able to specialize, the way that universities may cater to certain student archetypes. The strongest organizations in this space already work this way, even without shared language to describe it. For example, MassChallenge has built its comparative advantage around Systems Challenger Ventures, bringing more than a decade of expertise in institutional markets, regulatory navigation, and systems-level ambition to the companies working at the intersection of high complexity, high potential, and high impact. Organizations like New Profit and Draper Richards Kaplan have built deep specialization in Earned-Revenue Nonprofits and, over time, expanded Market Access Ventures. Each carries a distinct worldview, a distinct network, and a distinct value proposition, and each is most powerful when deployed in its natural domain.

Solutions must come from practitioners evolving their practice to focus on utility over precision. Today, for example, public market investors sort stocks or strategies into value or growth even though some fall in between because the labels are useful, not exact. That is the standard to aim for: approximate definitions that signal risk, return and impact. Three steps can get us started.

  1. Market Makers: Get more specific. Scaled funders and intermediaries can and should clarify their position in the market. “We support social impact ventures” could become “We support earned-revenue nonprofits and market access ventures focused on economic mobility.” Out in the market that sentence separates the key variables (legal form, who the customer is, and the scale of ambition) for limited partners looking to place capital and for founders looking for the right partners.
  2. Entrepreneurs: Know where you sit and say why. Founders should be ready to explain how their impact, business model and capital needs fit together, and what kind of enterprise that makes them. In my experience, the biggest “aha” comes when a founder names not just their cause but their customer. Additionally, earned-revenue nonprofits and market access ventures should state their legal form up front, since funders often cannot tell from the mission alone. Precision in a pitch sends the same signal we are asking of market makers, and is equally critical.
  3. Field builders: put the taxonomy to the test. Academics rarely lead markets, but they often help define them. MassChallenge has shared its data with faculty at Harvard, Northeastern, and MIT, among others, to study which kinds of problems get solved and what sets apart the hard problems that still reach commercial success. I invite my peers to share their data with researchers and other field-building organizations who can test archetypes and to refine them over time. Institutions that teach in this field, including my alma mater, Harvard Business School, can lead again by updating courses like “Scaling Social Enterprise” so students learn that different archetypes call for different approaches to entrepreneurship, commercialization, fundraising and more.

Finally, I welcome open debate, online and off, to sharpen the archetypes, improve on the taxonomy, bring them most importantly into daily practice.

The impact economy has earned its next stage. It is time to retire the term social enterprise.

Read more stories by Caitlin Reimers Brumme.