(Photo by iStock/Krle)
Civic space is rapidly constricting in the United States, as so many organizations can testify. Defined as the environment—both physical and digital—in which people gather to participate in the political, economic, and social life of society, civic space is under threat across the world, of course. But this is increasingly the case as well in the United States. From targeted attacks on nonprofits and lawsuits against media to new federal regulations, cumbersome reporting requirements, and a variety of restrictions on freedoms of assembly, the United States is not immune from the larger trend of democratic decline.
However drastic these changes are, they will not be new to funders supporting nonprofit organizations in countries like Russia, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, or Hungary. From inside a major funder that has worked in closed civic spaces for more than 15 years, we’ve learned a great deal about how to meet the moment (sometimes after learning and trying again). Changes to civic space don’t always happen overnight, nor do the consequences: As the instability created leads to isolation, it reduces collaboration and public involvement. It can cause panic and fear, from the largest funder to the smallest nonprofit. Organizations can come to feel like they are taking risks simply by existing, while funders feel vulnerable. And if a funder isn’t adaptable, it only increases grantee isolation and fear.
Below are five key lessons we’ve learned from supporting nonprofits working in countries experiencing democratic decline, which are, unfortunately, directly applicable in today’s domestic context.
1. Strive for Accountability Without Rigidity
Originally, the bureaucracy for contract management for US funding was just as complex for relatively small grants to local nonprofits as it was for multi-million-dollar contracts to international organizations. But over the years, a “trust but verify” approach allowed for more flexibility with smaller, local grantees, after they had proven internal controls and track records. We modified assistance awards to be better tailored to smaller organizations, without losing accountability. We turned crisis modifiers—contract or grant amendments for use during an external crisis—into fixed awards, with less sub-grant bureaucracy, all within the letter of the law. Trusting organizations also included providing more core funding for organizational costs, rather than project-based costs, which was essential for organizations operating in dynamic environments.
“Trust but verify” approaches improved both programs and outcomes, allowing organizations to quickly adapt their programs in response to changes in the civic space environment. In Zimbabwe and Uganda, for example, shifting support to new, unforeseen priorities like physical and digital security preserved the basic operations and wellbeing of organizations operating in these restrictive environments. In addition, flexible support meant less time spent on contracting and more on working with organizations on their mission, which increased program outcomes. Notably, at the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, flexible support to nonprofits enabled those groups to quickly pivot their activities to support internally displaced persons (IDPs), document war crimes, provide psychosocial support to veterans, and more. Most importantly, more core, unrestricted funding actually allowed organizations to make the changes needed for success in a changing environment.
2. Co-Design Is the Key
Traditionally, programs and monitoring plans would be designed in collaboration with local officials and organizations, but be rigid once the awards were signed. That worked to some extent—in stable contexts—but organizations and communities still didn’t feel full ownership or buy-in. When the money dried up, so too did the results. What was needed was more co-design.
Co-design and co-development—genuinely working together with local stakeholders (including government, communities and grantees)— to define the problems and potential solutions became more common and accepted as a design best practice around 2018. Combining international best practices with on-the-ground knowledge and local expertise, it was done at a slower pace to enable participation from diverse stakeholders. Legally, co-development was done through more broad Statements of Objectives, rather than the previous narrowly scoped Request for Proposals (the infamous RFPs), allowing deeper and more genuine collaboration. The appearance of legislation mandating longer design periods also enhanced co-design’s success.
Co-development also meant time spent cultivating local relationships and a dedication to listening, even when not designing a new award or project. For example, in Libya in 2021—between the cease-fire and a planned election—we carried out a listening tour to better understand Libyan people’s lived experiences, how they coped with uncertainty about the future, what they hoped that future would look like, and their expectations around the upcoming elections. This allowed existing programming to be tailored to be more responsive, allowing the funding decision-making team to get closer to citizens (since the programming was in a country where the funder had no in-country presence).
Co-design enabled communities to identify their own problems and solutions to development challenges. In Vietnam, co-design identified issues, like clean water management, that could pass the tough government approval process and still be effective in the community.
Where civic spaces are closing, co-design is key to sustainable success.
3. Flexibility, Flexibility, Flexibility
Flexible program design and evaluation resulted in stronger results no matter what the external environment.
We were able to make program implementation more flexible, both in implementation and evaluation, by reducing bureaucracy in minor changes, for example, by removing annual work plans from contracts and adding them to activity plans, and writing six-month workplans so partners didn’t have to get work plans constantly re-approved when the external environment changed. Grantees could be accountable through flexible Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning plans (MEL), especially by incorporating complexity aware MEL tools like periodic “pause and reflect sessions”, outcomes harvests, and Most Significant Change (MSC), which enabled the grantee to be accountable to its constituents as well as the funder, and more importantly maintain flexibility and co-creation throughout implementation.
For example, following a “pause and reflect” funder/partner session in a global closing spaces program in 72 countries, participants decided to focus more money in fewer countries to ensure there were enough programs for real impact. Adaptable strategic plans allowed organizations to adjust when conditions changed. Flexible MEL allowed both funder and partner to see what worked, what didn't, and the unintended consequences - even through repeated plan adjustments. Planning with shorter timeframes and built in trip wires when the context changed were especially useful in fluid environments.
4. The Devil Is in the Details
Local tax and administrative law can easily be used against nonprofit organizations. As a funder, therefore, it became necessary for us to become experts and coaches on a host of legal issues. When the expertise needed was extremely technical or legally complicated, a number of organizations, experts, and legal norms could be called upon. For example, the International Center for Nonprofit Law provides analysis and expertise on the legal enabling environment domestically and internationally. International norms like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s Recommendation 8 exist to protect nonprofits, as do international bodies like the Community of Democracies Working Group on Enabling and Protecting Civil Society.
However, the important thing is that organizations gain the skills and international best practices needed to solve their problems independently. Groups in Serbia, with support from a funder, were able to use the laws of the European Union to push back against hostile legislation. Having an expert legal resource at the ready is important, but more importantly, an experienced donor staff or coach can often address most of these issues before they escalate. Financial staff in multiple country offices where we worked became experts at helping local nonprofits through tricky issues like tax exemption. For example, in one country, funder and nonprofit financial staff co-developed a financial management software, which was later sold to other local organizations as part of the nonprofit’s revenue diversification plan. This empowerment ultimately gave agency to the organizations themselves.
5. Change Is an Opportunity to Reorient and Reprioritize
When a crisis hits, especially a financial or political one, funders and grantees are often so busy putting out fires that leaders claim there isn’t time to worry about “invisible issues” like stress-tested leadership and governance.
As a funder, however, it makes sense to step back, orient, and reorganize based on the moment. The lines of effort that are sensible in a stable moment are not always applicable in an unstable one, and the mismatch of effort can actually lead to more triage than needed. In Ecuador under President Rafael Correa, for example—whose tenure coincided with significant declines in Freedom House's freedoms for civil society and restrictions on funder work—funder programs added quarterly meetings of stakeholders, including local and provincial government officials. This enabled programs to align with local development priorities as they shifted with national priorities.
In Nicaragua, organizations with training from a funder, learned how to migrate offshore and still be effective in their home country, enabling them to provide lifesaving support to human rights activists during a government shutdown. Every organization needed a customized approach; each group was unique, each locality really is distinct, but there are themes in common and practices that are transferable. Through responsive governance, organizations can survive and thrive even during tough times, while the funder is able to more appropriately meet the needs of their partners.
When It’s Happening Here
Foundations supporting the US civic sector are now grappling with some of the same civic space constraints as we’ve described. But from observing this cycle repeat, over and over again, in different contexts, it’s important to remember that all is not lost in closing civic spaces. Indeed, as Freedom House states, “new democracies have repeatedly taken root under difficult circumstances, and aspirations for democracy routinely find popular support in even the most repressive environments.”
This has played out overseas; in Ecuador, for example, civic institutions were ready once the democratic space opened after Rafael Correa lost his last election. In Paraguay, nonprofits came together across party lines to fight against bad legislation. These lessons demonstrate that nonprofits can adapt, even in uncertain environments. Having a genuinely supportive ally from funders will only enhance this success.
Read more stories by Laura McKechnie.